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The sense of controlling one’s own actions is fundamental to normal human mental
function, and also underlies concepts of social responsibility for action. However, it
remains unclear how the wider social context of human action influences sense of
agency. Using a simple experimental design, we investigated, for the first time, how
observing the action of another person or a robot could potentially influence one’s
own sense of agency. We assessed how observing another’s action might change
the perceived temporal relationship between one’s own voluntary actions and their
outcomes, which has been proposed as an implicit measure of sense of agency.
Working in pairs, participants chose between two action alternatives, one rewarded
more frequently than the other, while watching a rotating clock hand. They judged, in
separate blocks, either the time of their own action, or the time of a tone that followed
the action. These were compared to baseline judgements of actions alone, or tones
alone, to calculate the perceptual shift of action toward outcome and vice versa. Our
design focused on how these two dependent variables, which jointly provide an implicit
measure of sense of agency, might be influenced by observing another’s action. In
the observational group, each participant could see the other’s actions. Multivariate
analysis showed that the perceived time of action and tone shifted progressively toward
the actual time of outcome with repeated experience of this social situation. No such
progressive change occurred in other groups for whom a barrier hid participants’ actions
from each other. However, a similar effect was observed in the group that viewed
movements of a human-like robotic hand, rather than actions of another person. This
finding suggests that observing the actions of others increases the salience of the
external outcomes of action and this effect is not unique to observing human agents.
Social contexts in which we see others controlling external events may play an important
role in mentally representing the impact of our own actions on the external world.
Keywords: sense of agency, intentional binding, action observation, robotic hand, social context
INTRODUCTION
The feeling of control over one’s own actions is referred to as ‘sense of agency.’ Sense of agency
is not only fundamental to instrumental, goal-directed actions at the individual level, but also
forms a cornerstone of everyday social life. In social animals, an instrumental action of one agent
will have outcomes that affect other agents, so some social management of individual action is
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required. In particular, the sociolegal concept that each individual
is responsible for their actions, and must answer for them to
others, requires that individuals are first aware of their actions,
and of the outcomes of those actions (Moretto et al., 2011; Frith,
2014). The relation between instrumental agency at the individual
level and the social aspects of agency has rarely been explored
experimentally: the present paper represents a first step in this
direction.
At heart, sense of agency depends on a mental association
between an intentional action and its sensory outcome (Spengler
et al., 2009; Moore et al., 2011). Indeed, human sense of
agency has several parallels with instrumental learning in animals
(Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). In particular, both sense of agency
and instrumental learning depend on a cognitive mechanism
that represents contingent relation between action and outcome,
based on previous experience (Cravo et al., 2009; Moore et al.,
2009), and then computes predictions of an outcome, given an
action (Frith et al., 2000; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000). The
human experimental literature has focussed largely on the signals
and conditions that produce a sense of agency. Relatively few
human studies have focussed on how observation of others may
influence the development of a sense of agency (Engbert et al.,
2007).
In classical instrumental learning, animals are thought to
learn instrumental relations by exploring the environment, and
by trial and error (Thorndike, 1905). However, action-outcome
association is acquired not only through individual learning, but
also by observing others (Brass and Heyes, 2005; Burke et al.,
2010). Imitation (Topál et al., 2008), and participation in joint
action (van der Wel et al., 2012) appear to facilitate emergence
of a sense of agency in social contexts, although neither is
essential. Interestingly, the idea of learning by observation is
central to most systems of education. On the other hand,
we frequently interact with machines. Such artificial agents
also perform functional actions which produce environmental
outcomes. However, several studies on joint actions highlighted
the role of human partnership (Sebanz et al., 2006; Obhi and
Sebanz, 2011; Stenzel et al., 2012), which depends on creating a
mental representation of the partner’s intentions (Sebanz et al.,
2006). One of the established methods to study joint action
is the joint Simon paradigm (Simon, 1969). In the standard
Simon task, spatial match between stimulus and response
facilitates task performance. Interestingly, the same effect is
observed across two participants in a joint Simon task when
the assigned stimulus corresponds to the response key that the
individual is responsible for operating it (Sebanz et al., 2003;
Dolk et al., 2014). This suggests that human agents share a
mental representation with other co-actors. However, this shared
representation diminishes when interacting with a non-human
agent (Müller et al., 2011a) or dissimilar human co-actor (Müller
et al., 2011b). A partner who is not recognized as sharing the
same mental representations as ours, for instance a robot, would
presumably not benefit from the “intentional stance” (Dennett,
1989). The effects of intentional vs non-intentional partners
on action representation and sense of agency have not been
systematically compared.
Several studies have reported effects of social context on
measures of sense of agency. Indeed, the dominant experimental
paradigms for explicit judgment of one’s own agency generally
involve attributing an action (Sirigu et al., 1999) or an outcome
to oneself, or to another agent (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999;
Strother et al., 2010; Obhi and Hall, 2011a,b). However, explicit
judgments of agency are rare in real life, and could vary because
of interpretational factors such as social acceptability, or other
socially mediated effects. Therefore, implicit measures may be
more appropriate for elucidating socially mediated changes in the
low-level experience of one’s own agency.
One suitable measure of the sense of agency is the perceived
temporal relationship between a voluntary action and its sensory
outcome (Haggard et al., 2002b). The perceived time of voluntary
actions and their sensory consequences are attracted toward
each other, relative to a baseline condition in which either
action or outcome occurs alone. This ‘intentional binding’
does not occur for involuntary movements, or for associations
between external events that do not involve voluntary actions
(Cravo et al., 2009). Thus, intentional binding may tap into
important low-level mechanisms of voluntary control over
instrumental actions. At the same time, intentional binding
was also reported to be sensitive to high-level factors such as
social context. For example, perceived social power relations
and social hierarchies modulate this effect (Obhi and Hall,
2011a,b; Poonian and Cunnington, 2013). In one recent study
(Pfister et al., 2014), social interaction between two people
was specifically constructed as part of the experimental design.
One participant (the follower) made actions in response to
the actions of another (the leader). Interestingly, the leader
showed intentional binding both for her own actions and for the
follower’s.
In the present experiment, we used intentional binding
to investigate whether observing the actions of a human or
a non-human agent could potentially influence one’s own
sense of agency. Our design goes beyond previous studies in
three important respects. First, we used implicit rather than
explicit measures of sense of agency. Second, we organized a
situation where the other’s action was clearly comparable to
one’s own performance. Third, our hypothesis directly targeted
the social modulation of action representation. We focused
on the progressive emergence of sense of agency provided by
ongoing social information, rather than on simply comparing
pre-test and post-test phases. In order to test this hypothesis,
we focused on changes across time of intentional binding
between action and outcome. We hypothesized that sense of
agency, as measured by intentional binding, would be affected
by observing the actions of others. Specifically, the social
context would potentiate the development of sense of agency,
compared to a non-social task involving individual performance.
To investigate whether these processes are unique to observing
human agents, we additionally included a condition in which
participants watched a non-human, robotic agent, performing
similar actions. We further hypothesized that acquisition of
sense of agency would be accordingly reduced in these
conditions.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Seventy two healthy volunteers (21 males), aged 18–35 (mean
23 years) were recruited form UCL Institute of Cognitive
Neuroscience data base. The study was approved by the UCL
Research Ethics Committee, and conformed to the Declaration
of Helsinki. All participants were right handed and had normal
or corrected to normal vision and hearing. Those participants
who were invited in pairs did not know each other before the
experimental session.
Behavioral Task
The intentional binding paradigm was used as a proxy measure of
sense of agency, broadly following methods described elsewhere
(Haggard et al., 2002b). Briefly, in each session, participants
were seated in front of a computer screen (viewing distance:
60 cm) and fixated on a clock with single rotating hand. Each
full rotation lasted 2560 ms. During the rotation, participants
pressed the left or right arrow on a keyboard, at a time of their
own free choice. After the key press, the clock hand stopped at a
random location, participants made a time judgment according
to condition (see later). Each experimental session consisted of
six types of trials, presented in separate blocks, performed in a
different randomized order by each participant. At the beginning
of each block, brief instructions for the relevant condition were
displayed on the screen. In the baseline action left and baseline
action right conditions, participants had to press the left or right
arrow, respectively, at a time of their own free choice. The clock
hand stopped after 1500–2500 ms (at random), and participants
then judged the clock hand position at the time of their key
press, entering their response on the keyboard. In this condition,
the participant’s actions produced no sensory outcome. In the
baseline beep and baseline buzz conditions, participants were
instructed to look at the clock but not to press any key. While
the clock was rotating, a beep (2000 Hz, 100 ms duration),
or a buzz (500 Hz, 100 ms duration), in separate blocks, was
played over a loudspeaker, 1750–4000 ms (at random) after the
onset of the trial. Participants were then asked to judge the
clock hand position at the time of the tone. The timings were
chosen to approximate the times of voluntary actions in other
conditions.
In the operant action condition, participants pressed the left
or right arrow key at a time of their own choosing. One key
caused a beep with probability of 0.7 and the other key with
probability of 0.3 after 250 ms. On the remaining trials, the buzz
was played instead of the beep. The mapping of keys to sounds
changed after every 9–11 trials, with the run length being random
within these limits. Participants were instructed to choose the
key that most often produced a beep. They were reminded that
the mappings were never 100% for both key, and that from time
to time, the outcomes associated with each key would switch,
so it was important that they pay attention to the tones, and
always choose the key that was most likely to give a beep. The
theoretical motivation for using a probabilistic action-outcome
relationship was to keep participants alert, interested and ready
to learn throughout the experiment. Variable reward schedules
require continuous attention, and make the occasional reward
worth pursuing (Zeiler, 1968; Mazur, 1986; Bateson and Kacelnik,
1995).
The beep was always defined as the “correct” tone, and was
associated with a monetary reward (£0.10 per trial, paid at the
end of the experiment). Participants were not rewarded for key
presses that produced buzzes. After the clock hand stopped,
participants judged the clock hand position at the moment of
pressing the key. Finally, the operant tone condition was similar to
the operant action condition, with the difference that participants
had to judge the clock hand position at the time of the tone onset
(beep or buzz) (Figure 1A).
The order of blocks was as follows. Baseline action and
baseline tone conditions were tested in separate blocks of 40 trials
at the beginning and end of the experiment, sandwiching the
operant conditions. The order of baseline blocks was randomized.
Each operant condition was tested in two blocks of 40 trials.
Therefore, each experimental session consisted of four operant
blocks in a random order, bracketed by four baseline blocks
(Figure 1B).
Experimental Design
The study used a 2 × 2 between-subject design. The first factor,
animacy, was related to the type of model available for action
observation. Participants were randomly assigned to either a
human model group, or a non-human (robotic hand) model
group. The second factor, action-observation, related to the
availability of information from the model. Participants were
randomly assigned to either observational, or individual groups
(see later) (Figures 1C and 2).
In the human model groups, participants were invited to the
experiment in gender-matched pairs. Each pair was seated in two
chairs positioned next to each other in front of the screen. In
three cases where one invited participant did not attend, he/she
was replaced by a gender-matched assistant who was blind to
purpose of the study. Data from the assistant was not included
in the analysis. At the beginning of each block, the participant
sitting on the left side started the task. The two participants
then alternated in performing the rest of the trials. Alternating
in performing the trials aimed to keep participants engaged with
the task and to encourage them to constantly follow each other’s
action. Throughout the task, participants had to judge their own
actions and outcomes, only. In the individual group, a barrier
was placed between the participants, so that they could not see
each other’s actions but they could see and hear each other’s
outcomes. Thus, the information from the other’s actions was
irrelevant for selecting the appropriate action, because action-
outcome mappings for others’ actions were not clear. This barrier
was removed for the observational group, so each participant
could see and hear each other’s actions and outcomes. The
behavioral task and the order of the blocks were exactly the same
for both groups. To be certain that participants paid attention
to each other’s actions in the observational group, participants
were occasionally asked to report the action (which key was
pressed) and the outcome (beep or buzz) of their partner in the
immediately preceding trial. They lost a point (£0.10) for giving
incorrect answers. The cumulative total of rewarded trials (i.e.,
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Timeline of an experimental trial. Participants were instructed to press the left or right arrow keys at a time of their own free choice. In the operant
conditions, each keypress was followed by a beep (2000 Hz) (rewarded) or a buzz (500 Hz) (non-rewarded) after 250 ms with different probabilities. At the end of the
trial, participants reported the perceived time of the action or of the tone. See the text for full explanation. (B) The experimental session started with one Baseline
Action and one Baseline Tone block. Four main experimental blocks, 2 Operant-Action and 2 Operant-Tone then followed in pseudorandomised order. All possible
block orders are shown. Each pair performed one of the six possible orders. The order of the operant blocks was counterbalanced across participants. The session
ended with the execution of the complementary blocks of Baseline Action and Baseline Tone. (C) 2 × 2 factorial design with the factors of animacy (human/robot
model) and action-observation (observational/individual). In the human-model groups two participants were seated in front of the screen and alternated in performing
trials. One of the participants was replaced with a robotic-hand in the non-human groups. An opaque barrier (thick black line) further divided each group to
‘observational’ and ‘individual’ groups. See the text for full explanation. Progress bars displayed the cumulative total of rewarded trials. Dotted lines represent gaze
direction.
actions producing beep, rather than buzz) was displayed on the
screen after each trial, and participants were paid a bonus at the
end of the experiment based on the total number of rewarded
trials.
In the non-human model groups, the co-participant was
replaced with a robotic hand. Thus, participants participated
singly, rather than in pairs. They were instructed that the robotic
hand was performing the same task, and robotic trials would
alternate with their own. Two keyboards were placed both in
front of the participant and in front of the robotic hand. The
index and ring fingers of the robotic hand were aligned with
the same keys as for the participant’s hand. The robot hand
was anthropomorphic and was based on rapid servo-actuated
tendons rotating each finger joint. In fact, the robot hand
movement was triggered by an invisible experimenter, wearing
a dataglove to which the robot was slaved, and located behind a
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FIGURE 2 | 2 × 2 factorial design with the factors of animacy (human/robot model) and action-observation (observational/individual). See Figure 1C
for details.
partition. The ‘judgments’ of the robot hand, were in fact entered
by the experimenter. The experimenter participated in the task
on the same basis as a participant in the experiment, but her
data was not analyzed. Importantly, in a previous experiment,
sense of agency was not influenced by the irrelevant movement of
the robotic hand. No difference in time judgment was observed
in a condition where the robotic hand made intermediate, but
irrelevant movements between the participant’s action and the
tone, and a condition without the robotic hand (Caspar et al.,
2015). This suggests that noise generated by the robotic hand is
unlikely to represent a confounding influence on time judgement.
In the observational group, the participant thus saw the robot
performing human-like actions. As in the human model group,
participants were occasionally asked to report the action and
the outcome of the robot in the immediately preceding trial.
In the individual group, the participant was only able to see
the judgments corresponding to the robot hand movement,
displayed on the monitor, but the robot hand itself was hidden
from view by a barrier, as in the human model group. All
participants saw how the robotic hand moved before starting
the experiment, and could hear the motor noise associated with
each movement of the robot during the whole experiment. To
make the robot’s performance seem identical to a human agent,
participants were told that the robotic hand is performing the
same task as the participant and will make its own decisions
whether to press the left or right arrow key. However, it does not
make perfect decisions and may make mistakes from time to time.
The behavioral task and the order of the blocks were exactly the
same for both groups.
Data Analysis
For each trial, judgment error was defined as the difference
between the judged clock hand position and the actual onset of
the corresponding event. A positive judgment error indicated a
perceptual delay; a negative judgment error an anticipation. The
mean and standard deviation of the judgment errors across trials
were then measured for each block type (see Figure 1B). Action
binding was defined as the shift of reported time of action toward
its outcome, and was calculated by subtracting each participant’s
judgment mean error in the baseline action conditions from
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that in the operant action condition. Likewise, tone binding was
defined as a shift in the perceived time of a tone toward the action
that triggered it. Tone binding was calculated by subtracting each
participant’s judgment error in baseline tone conditions from
operant tone condition. Thus, perceptual association of an action
with a subsequent tone produced a positive value for action
binding, and a negative value for tone binding. To investigate
continuous acquisition of sense of agency, we considered how
the action and tone binding effects changed over successive
trials. The relation between binding effect and trial number was
calculated within each group using a linear regression approach.
As choice of bin size would be rather arbitrary, the regression
slope was computed against single trials rather than trial bins.
Importantly, because timing estimates using the rotating clock
hand were noisy, we used bisquare robust regression analysis to
avoid overall estimates of changes in binding being excessively
driven by a small number of trials with large judgment errors
toward the end or beginning of the experimental session (Huber,
2004).
Our experimental design was based on the 2 × 2 factorial
combination of groups (Figures 1C and 2). We had clear
directional hypotheses about the differences between groups,
based on previous action observation literature. Specifically,
we predicted that participants would show greater context-
related changes in intentional binding, in observational rather
than individual groups, and for a human model, rather than a
non-human model. Because we did not have prior hypotheses
regarding which combination of our two dependent variables
(action binding and tone binding) might be influenced by
social context, we applied 2 × 2 multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) applied to both action and tone binding
simultaneously. Inspection of canonical variates for significant
MANOVA effects was used to investigate the extent to which our
experimental design factors influenced each dependent variable,
and these influences were confirmed with univariate t-tests.
RESULTS
Seventy two participants were tested in total. Eight were excluded
because of technical errors (two participants) or inability to
complete the task (six participants). Data from 64 participants
were retained for analysis (human model observational group,
17 participants; human model individual group, 16 participants;
non-human model observational group, 16 participants; non-
human model individual group, 15 participants).
We confirmed an overall effect of action binding and tone
binding, relative to the respective baseline conditions (Table 1).
The perceived time of action execution was shifted toward the
tone (outcome) by an average 66 ms [SE = 9 ms, t(63) = 7.50,
p< 0.01 one-tailed comparison against zero]. The perceived time
of tone was shifted toward the action by an average −105 ms
[SE = 13 ms, t(63) = −8.00, p < 0.01 one-tailed comparison
against zero]. These results replicated previous reports on
intentional binding (Haggard et al., 2002a,b).
We next investigated possible differences in binding between
the 4 groups of the 2 × 2 design. There was no significant
TABLE 1 | The mean (and standard error across participants) for binding,
and robust regression slope showing the relation between binding and
trial number.
Groups Mean binding (ms) Regression slope
(ms/trial)
Action
binding
Tone
binding
Action
binding
Tone
binding
Human observational 64 (17)∗ −133 (25)∗ 1.9 (0.5)∗ 2.1 (0.9)
Human individual 71 (17)∗ −100 (27)∗ −0.9 (0.8) 1 (0.9)
Robot observational 63 (18)∗ −85 (27)∗ 1 (0.4) −0.8 (0.8)
Robot individual 67 (20)∗ −98 (24)∗ 0.2 (0.4) 1 (0.7)
Separate one-sample, one-tailed t-tests were used to investigate each dependent
variable. ∗Significant values after Bonferroni correction for four conditions.
main effect of animacy [F(2,59) = 1.00, p = 0.37, η2 = 0.03]
or action-observation [F(2,59) = 0.07, p = 0.93, η2 < 0.01] and
no interaction [F(2,59) = 0.63, p = 0.54, η2 = 0.02] on the
combination of both mean action and tone binding. Therefore,
no follow-up analyses were performed on mean binding data.
To investigate how these contextual factors might
progressively transform intentional binding, separate robust
regressions of action and tone shift against trial number were
fitted for each participant. A positive slope for this regression
would correspond to an increase in action binding with
progressive exposure to the other’s action. Conversely an
increase in tone binding with exposure to the other’s action
would produce a negative slope, because of the negative sign
of tone binding (see Supplementary Figure S1). We calculated
the slope for each participant (i.e., random effects). Next, the
robust regression slopes for action and tone binding were used
as dependent variables in MANOVA. The model revealed a
significant intercept [F(2,59) = 3.70, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.11],
implying a progressive linear change in combined action and
tone binding during each block (Table 1). Having established
evidence for progressive changes in intentional binding over the
whole dataset, we next investigated whether these effects varied
across the different experimental groups. MANOVA showed
a significant main effect of action-observation on combined
action and tone binding slopes [F(2,59) = 4.73, p = 0.01,
η2 = 0.14]. Separate univariate tests revealed a significant
main effect of action-observation on action binding slope
[t(62) = 3.13, p < 0.01, d = 0.80] but not on tone binding
slope [t(62) = −0.31, p = 0.76, d = 0.08]. This implied that the
major social effect of observing others’ actions was a change in
action binding (Figure 3). These impressions were confirmed
by the standardized canonical coefficients from the MANOVA
of robust regression slopes. These suggested that observation
primarily influences action binding (standardized coefficient
1.07) rather than tone binding (standardized coefficient
−0.07, see Supplementary Table S1 for coefficients for the full
MANOVA design). We found no significant MANOVA main
effect of the animacy factor [F(2,59)= 1.46, p= 0.24, η2 = 0.05],
suggesting that animacy had no prominent effect on changes
of intentional binding. The interaction between these two
factors approached but did not reach the level of significance
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FIGURE 3 | Changes of intentional binding over trials, plotted
separately for (A) action binding and (B) tone binding. The values on
vertical axes are regression slopes (changes of binding in ms per trial).
A positive slope for this regression would correspond to an increase in action
binding with progressive exposure to the other’s action, but a decrease in tone
binding, because of the negative sign of tone binding. Error bars show
standard errors.
[F(2,59)= 2.72, p= 0.07, η2 = 0.09]. This suggests that contrary
to our primary prediction, the effect of action-observation on
acquisition of sense of agency is not specific to observing human
agents.
We also tested the intercepts of the robust regression, to assess
whether there were differences in the initial level of intentional
binding in each condition, in addition to the changes in binding
captured by our test of regression slopes. We found no main effect
of action-observation [F(2,59) = 1.96, p = 0.15, η2 = 0.06], or
animacy [F(2,59) = 2.27, p = 0.12, η2 = 0.07] factors, and no
significant interaction between them [F(2,59) = 1.14, p = 0.33,
η2 = 0.04]. This suggests that the observed effect is driven by
a process that cumulates gradually during the experiment, as
a function of exposure to others’ actions, and does not merely
reflect a difference in starting point.
To check whether the observed increase in perceptual delay
over operant trials is actually driven by the social context,
and not by some general feature of the task, we checked the
slopes in the baseline condition. Separate one-sample, one-tailed
t-tests did not show any relation between binding and trial
number in the baseline condition (Supplementary Table S2). This
suggests that non-specific changes in perceptual delay, related to
factors other than social-observational context, cannot account
for the progressive changes in intentional binding seen in our
experimental conditions.
To summarize, we observed a pattern of progressive change in
implicit measures of sense of agency based on time perception.
MANOVA testing confirmed the simultaneous presence of two
progressive changes over the course of each block. First, outcome
perception became increasingly accurate, leading to a reduction
in tone binding. Second, the perceived time of action was
progressively captured by the outcome. This latter effect was
most marked for observing others’ actions rather than individual
performance, and was detected when observing another person,
as well as observing a human-like robot (Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
We used a simple experimental design to investigate the influence
of observing others’ actions on an implicit measure of sense
of agency. We also investigated whether a human model was
necessary for these effects to emerge. We found that the
perceived time of action and tone both moved toward the actual
time of outcome in the observational group. This produced a
progressive increase in action binding, and a progressive decrease
in tone binding, with cumulating experience. Interestingly, this
shift in the perceived time of action and tone was detected
in participants who observed a human model as well as
in participants who observed a robot hand, although it was
numerically stronger in the former group. Thus, our results
strongly suggest that the sense of agency for instrumental
action, at least as measured with intentional binding, is not
stationary, but gradually changes based on evidence both
internal and external to the agent. This development of sense
of agency is not restricted to observing a human agent.
MANOVA analysis of robust regression slopes clarified the
direction of this influence of social context: action binding
increased across successive trials, while tone binding decreased.
That is, with repetition, the perception of actions became
increasingly biased toward the outcomes of those actions, while
the perception of the outcomes themselves became progressively
less biased.
These changes suggest an ‘ideomotor shift’ in the perception
of instrumental actions, with exposure leading to an increased
importance of the outcome, relative to the action that produces
it. Initially, the action itself has a relatively strong weighting in
computing the sense of agency. However, repeated observation
of others executing actions, and producing the corresponding
outcomes, induced a gradual shift in the weighting of experience
away from the action, and toward the outcome. These progressive
changes in binding were stronger when participants could
observe the actions of the other agent than when they could
not. Further, the effects of observing a human confederate were
not statistically different from observing a robot hand. These
results are also compatible with a recent framework derived
from theory of event coding. Based on this framework, in
a social context where two participants perform in a joint
response task, actions and representations of each participant
can reshape the representations of the other’s actions (Prinz,
2015). We similarly showed that observing the actions of
another agent reshapes the salience of one’s own action
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1315
fpsyg-07-01315 August 27, 2016 Time: 12:1 # 8
Khalighinejad et al. Social Transmission of Experience of Agency
FIGURE 4 | The evolution of action and tone binding, plotted separately for each experimental group. In each group, average binding in the first and last
10 trials is shown in the upper and lower lines, respectively (lines with endpoints). Thick black arrows illustrate the change in action and tone binding over successive
trials. A rightward arrow corresponds to an increase in action binding, but a decrease in tone binding. A leftward arrow corresponds to a decrease in action binding,
but an increase in tone binding. Binding effects are drawn to scale.
outcomes. Finally, these effects of observation were found
primarily in action binding. Tone binding was essentially similar
between the different observation groups, and showed only
a general trend in all conditions toward less biased tone
perception with repeated exposure. In contrast, observing the
instrumental actions of another agent led to the perception
of one’s own actions being more strongly captured by the
outcome.
This pattern of results is consistent with the concept that
observing the instrumental actions of another agent may
enhance the salience and importance of action outcomes in
producing sense of agency, as measured by temporal event
perception. We could not measure saliency of events directly
in our design, but salient events are known to capture
temporal event perception (Wolpe et al., 2013). Importantly,
the intentional binding measure that we used as a proxy for
sense of agency was entirely independent of the action selection
task, and we gave no feedback regarding timing judgments.
Thus, the changes in the experience of instrumental action
were incidental to the participant’s primary task of identifying
which key to press on each trial. The observed actions of
the other agent were, moreover, irrelevant to the participant’s
secondary task of timing judgment, because participants only
judged the time of their own actions or outcomes. For these
reasons, the social influence on sense of agency appears to
be an incidental and automatic effect of social context. That
is, simply having access to information about the relation
between others’ actions and outcomes produced a stronger
representation of the outcomes of one’s own instrumental
agency. This result suggests a social facilitation of sense of
agency.
In this study, participants alternated between performing
the task and observing their partner, meaning that they were
immersed in a mixture of observational and performance
environments. Therefore, we cannot distinguish the pure
effects of observation in the absence of any action at all.
Rather, our findings suggest that observation can enhance
one’s own sense of agency during performance. In that sense,
our experimental design involved a kind of intermittently
active observation, rather than purely passive observation.
Merely watching, without ever doing, might not have any
consequences for subsequent agency. For example, in a more
classical observational learning paradigm, participants learned
the association between an action and its effect by observing a
model. In that study, learning a novel action-effect association
occurred strictly through observation of another agent (Paulus
et al., 2011), and without any action on the agent’s part.
However, that study did not address the sense of agency
directly.
Most previous studies on sense of agency have not addressed
the process of acquisition of agency. This may be because
human instrumental learning is often very rapid. Moore and
Haggard (2008) showed that reinforcement of action-outcome
association on the immediately preceding trial can increase
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action binding compared to an experience in the more distant
past. Another study showed that intentional binding depends
on predictions of when the outcome will occur, based on
previous experience (Walsh and Haggard, 2013). Interestingly,
these temporal predictions were updated very rapidly, over a
few trials. Our results point to the acquisition of agency over a
slower timescale of several trials. This difference in timescales
could reflect either a different mechanism of acquisition of agency
from one’s own vs. others’ actions, or a difference in acquisition
rate.
Contrary to our primary prediction we did not find any
significant difference between observing a human and a non-
human agent. At least one previous study has explored awareness
of actions in human and non-human agents. Participants
reported the perceptual time of action that was executed
by themselves, by another participant, or by a machine. No
difference was observed between the judgements for self- and
other-generated actions, but a significant difference was detected
for machine actions. Participants attributed their intentions to
others, but not to the machine (Wohlschläger et al., 2003). That
experiment, however, differed from ours in that participants had
to make agency judgments for their own and other-generated
actions while in our study they had to make judgments only
for their own actions. The joint action literature suggests that
similarity between agent and co-agent can influence action co-
representation as measured by joint Simon effect (JSE) (Dolk
et al., 2014). Interestingly, when participants shared a task
with a humanoid robot, their belief about the humanness of
the robot influenced JSE. Human agents co-represented the
action of the robot when sharing the task with a human-like
but not a machine-like robot (Stenzel et al., 2012). In another
experiment, JSE was observed with both biological and non-
biological co-actors. The authors suggested that JSE can occur
as long as the participant believes that they are interacting with
another agent, regardless of the agent’s identity (Wen and Hsieh,
2015). In our experiment, the robot hand was anthropomorphic.
Participants were told that the robotic hand makes its own
decisions but can also make mistakes in a very human-like
manner. We believe that the comparable effects for human and
robotic hands may be due to anthropomorphising the robotic
hand: participants were told that they are interacting with an
‘intentional,’ ‘human-like’ agent (Epley et al., 2007). Interestingly,
even though the robotic hand was life-like, it was obviously not
connected to a body. This suggests that the influence of physical
appearance of the robot on action representation was overwritten
by top–down belief processes (Stenzel et al., 2012). Therefore,
observing robots controlling external events may similarly play
an important role in mentally representing the impact of our own
actions, when one believes that the robot functions in a human-
like manner. Future research might systematically manipulate
the factors that make an artificial agent sufficiently human-
like.
Previous studies using intentional binding effects have
used a range of dependent variables. One approach is
to simply sum the action binding and tone binding to
create an overall binding score. We have not used that
measure here. Dissociations between action binding and
tone binding have been reported previously (Wolpe et al.,
2013). Instead, our main approach involved analyzing action
binding and tone binding in parallel, using a multivariate
approach. In addition, our analysis of the effects of observing
other agents focussed on progressive changes in temporal
judgment over repeated trials, while almost all previous
studies analyzed means. Because action binding and tone
binding are measured in separate blocks, it is not possible to
calculate a composite binding measure for individual trials.
We therefore preferred to quantify changes in action and tone
binding separately and then apply MANOVA to both measures
simultaneously.
We recognize a number of limitations in our study. First,
although the number of participants is high, the design may seem
underpowered for between-subject comparison, since there are
just 16 people per group. However, other studies on joint-action,
which is the most relevant comparable field, have used similar
group sizes (Obhi and Hall, 2011a; van der Wel et al., 2012;
Stenzel et al., 2014; Eskenazi et al., 2015). Another limitation
is the position of response pads. In the robot observational
condition, the robot and the human participants used separate
response pads. This was a technical limitation: the robot hand
did not have sufficient range of movement for us to move it
away from the response key while the participant made their
action. In contrast, for the human observation condition, the
model and the participant took turns to use the same response
pad. We acknowledge this as a potential confound. Nevertheless,
the relevant detail for the task was that both human and
robot could produce outcomes by pressing one of the two
keys.
Overall, we suggest that presence of others increases the
role of external outcomes in action awareness. As social
and communicative animals, a dominant source of our
information about the external world is not our own direct
experience, but knowledge acquired from others. That is,
social communicative situations provide an opportunity to
acquire beliefs about the world (Grice and Strawson, 1956).
We believe that our findings highlight the crucial role of
directing attention toward the actions and outcomes of others
in sociocultural transmission of skills in humans. According
to one view, social responsibility for action involves a self-to-
other direction of cognitive generalization. That is, one first
represents the consequences of one’s own instrumental actions
on the immediate physical environment, and, in a second
stage, represents that one’s actions also have consequences
on other people. An alternative view suggests an other-to-
self direction: representing the actions of others may facilitate
representation of the impact of what one does oneself (Hauf
and Prinz, 2005). Our results suggest an important role of
other-to-self, or me-like-you processes in human sense of
agency. When other agents are present in a social context,
actions become progressively represented in terms of their
external effects, rather than the intentional processes associated
with execution. Importantly, this change is not human-specific
and also occurs in the presence of human-like non-biological
objects. This is particularly important given the ever increasing
interaction between humans and technology (for a review see
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Limerick et al., 2014). We speculate that contexts in which other
agents are present lead to an emphasis on the external, shared,
consequences of action, rather than individual intentionality.
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